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FAITH-BASED EMERGENCY POWERS
NOA BEN-ASHER*
This Article explores an expanding phenomenon that it calls Faith-
Based Emergency Powers. In the twenty-first century, conservatives have
come to rely heavily on Faith-Based Emergency Powers as a leading legal
strategy in the Culture Wars. This strategy involves carving faith-based ex-
ceptions to rights of women and LGBT people. The concept of Faith-Based
Emergency Powers is developed in this Article through an analogy to the
“War on Terror.” In the War on Terror, conservatives typically have taken
the position that judges, legislators, and the public must defer to the Presi-
dent and the executive branch in matters involving national security. This
argument has three components: (1) rhetoric of war, emergency or catastro-
phe; (2) legal argument for suspension of existing human rights; and (3)
designation of decision-makers who are allegedly more qualified than courts
or the legislature to address the emergency.
The principal claim of this Article is that in contemporary Culture Wars
in the United States, conservative politicians, lawmakers, and litigants have
imported the three-step emergency powers rationale to “defend” religious
liberties. In recent years, there has been a growth in claims for religious
exemptions in many legal contexts, including free exercise challenges to
marriage-equality and the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The desired conse-
quence of the conservative turn to emergency powers rationales in the Cul-
ture Wars is to suspend or diminish rights of women and sexual minorities.
As such, this Article argues that the Supreme Court and other lawmakers
facing similar dilemmas today ought to defend the rule of law by rejecting
Faith-Based Emergency Powers.
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INTRODUCTION
Lately, conservatives have advanced emergency-powers rationales,
analogous to those used in the “War on Terror,”1 in their efforts to resist
liberal advancements in the so-called “Culture Wars.” The term “Culture
Wars” refers to the cultural and legal struggle of liberals and conservatives
in the United States over gender, sexuality, and reproductive issues.2 In the
Supreme Court, from Griswold (1965) and Boutilier (1967) to Hobby Lobby
(2014) and Obergefell (2015),3 liberals and conservatives have debated the
meaning of gender, reproduction, and sexuality under the law.4 In the early
Culture Wars, beginning in the 1960s, the debates involved whether tradi-
tional morality ought to shape legal rules such as anti-sodomy laws and
abortion bans.5 Conservatives argued that legal rules should govern individ-
ual morality (often through criminal prohibition), and liberals argued that
1 See generally David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency Inside
or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005 (2006) (arguing that “states of
emergency” are inherently outside of the realm of law); David Abraham, The Bush Re-
gime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl Schmitt and Human Rights,
62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249 (2008) (comparing the strategies used by conservatives to elect
the controversial Bush Administration and the Administration’s subsequent post-9/11
rights-limiting regime to historical fascist regimes, in particular Nazi Germany).
2 See generally ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA (2015) (ex-
ploring historical foundations and consequences of the “Culture Wars”). Political scien-
tist Corey Robin describes conservatism as a “felt experience of having power, seeing it
threatened, and trying to win it back.” COREY ROBIN, THE REACTIONARY MIND: CONSER-
VATISM FROM EDMUND BURKE TO SARAH PALIN 4 (2011).
3 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that law
prohibiting contraception unconstitutionally infringed right to privacy); Boutilier v. Im-
migration & Nat. Serv., 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (holding that homosexual man could be
excluded from entry into U.S. as having “psychopathic personality”); Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that religious beliefs of owners could
exempt closely held corporation exempt from regulation); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015) (holding that same-sex couples had constitutional right to marriage).
4 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 738–39
(1989) (arguing that the right to privacy is tied to sexual freedom and the Culture Wars);
Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/
LEFT CRITIQUE 178, 184–88 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (discussing dif-
fering liberal and conservative ideologies regarding rights in U.S. law).
5 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–95 (1986).
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they should not.6 In recent years, the terms of the debates have shifted. Con-
servatives have turned to a new strategy that involves declaring an emer-
gency or crisis in order to carve out exceptions to legal rights.7 This Article
calls this relatively new trend in the Culture Wars, “Faith-Based Emergency
Powers.”8
The concept of Faith-Based Emergency Powers is developed in this Ar-
ticle by exploring the analogy to emergency powers rationales applied in
relation to War on Terror policies. In the War on Terror, conservatives typi-
cally take the position that legislatures, the public, and especially courts
must defer to the President and the executive branch in matters involving
national security.9 This rationale has three components: (1) a rhetoric of war,
emergency, or catastrophe; (2) a legal argument for suspension of existing
human rights; and (3) the designation of decision-makers who are allegedly
more qualified than courts or the legislature to address the emergency.10
Consequently, conservatives have argued that human rights ought to be sus-
pended or abrogated to some extent in real or perceived national security
emergencies.11 The principal claim of this Article is that in contemporary
Culture Wars, conservative politicians, lawmakers, and litigants have im-
ported this three-step rationale to “defend” religious liberties.
6 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of
Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is
called into question by today’s decision . . . .”).
7 See, e.g., Dyzenhaus, supra note 1, at 2038–39 (discussing attempt to suspend R
habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees); Abraham, supra note 1, at 258–61 (comparing R
USA PATRIOT Act to emergency powers legislation in Nazi Germany); see generally
Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 699 (2010) [here-
inafter Legalism and Decisionism] (exploring different attitudes towards emergency gov-
ernance in United States); Noa Ben-Asher, Legal Holes, 5 UNBOUND HARV. J. LEGAL
LEFT 1 (2009) [hereinafter Legal Holes] (exploring different views of “holes” that arise
when the law implicitly or explicitly exempts government actors from following the law).
8 Emergency powers rationales have also been used in international law to carve
exceptions for the United States, a phenomenon referred to as “American exceptional-
ism.” See Michael Ignatieff, Introduction, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 1, 4 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) (arguing that one key variant of American
exceptionalism is that the U.S. supports “agreements and regimes, but only if they permit
exemptions for American citizens or U.S. practices”); see also Harold H. Koh, On Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1483, 1485–87 (2003) (arguing that “double
standards[ ]present[ ] the most dangerous and destructive form of American exception-
alism” because “the United States proposes that a different rule should apply to itself
than applies to the rest of the world”).
9 For examples of conservative academics arguing in favor of this position, see RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMER-
GENCY 35–41 (2006); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE:
SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 15–18 (2007); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1133–36 (2009); Julian Ku & John Yoo,
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Execu-
tive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 201–02, 205 (2006).
10 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 69–71; Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 180. R
11 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 69–71, 82–85, 119 (laying out balancing consid- R
erations for military detention, torture, and racial profiling).
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The Culture Wars of today have drawn the attention of legal scholars.
Several have supported religious exemptions.12 Douglas Laycock, for in-
stance, has argued that “individuals or institutions [should not be made to]
assist or facilitate practices they consider immoral, except . . . where the
goods or services requested are not available from another reasonably con-
venient provider.”13 Andrew Koppelman has likewise proposed that
“[b]usinesses that serve the public, such as wedding photographers, should
be exempted, but only if they are willing to bear the cost of publicly identi-
fying themselves as discriminatory.”14 Many others have objected. They
have elaborated on how religious accommodations may harm third parties,15
create an alternative legal order,16 and become limitless.17
In providing a framework of Faith-Based Emergency Powers, this Arti-
cle adds to the liberal critique of religious exemptions by focusing on the
form of the current arguments for such exemptions. It argues that religious
exemptions are in fact calculated attempts to limit or suspend liberal norms.
The existence of an emergency puts into question the normal state of things:
12 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL
L. REV. 839, 867–68 (2014); Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommoda-
tions, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 619–21
(2015); Edward Whelan, The HHS Contraception Mandate vs. the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2180–81 (2012).
13 Laycock, supra note 12, at 879. R
14 Koppelman, supra note 12, at 620. Koppelman hypothesizes that the “cost will R
make discrimination rare almost everywhere.” Id.
15 See generally Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations
Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015) (arguing against
allowing religious exemptions in anti-discrimination measures); Douglas Nejaime &
Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015) (arguing that religious exemptions prolong conflict
instead of finding solutions); Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil
Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015) (arguing that religious exemptions are unconstitu-
tional); Amy Sepinwall, Conscience And Complicity: Assessing Pleas For Religious Ex-
emptions After Hobby Lobby, 82 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1897 (2015) (arguing that religious
exemptions impose a substantial burden on third parties); Nancy J. Knauer, Religious
Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of Religion, 84 U.M.K.C. L. REV.
749 (2016) (arguing that religious exemptions “are not consistent with our tradition of
religious liberty or civil rights protections”).
16 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public Ac-
commodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1237–40 (2014) (arguing that libertarian
opponents will utilize First Amendment arguments against public accommodation laws,
spurring the same concerns raised during the Reconstruction and Civil Rights eras).
17 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Hobby Lobby captures these three concerns. See
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2751, 2787–806 (2014) (Ginsburg, J.
dissenting). Ginsburg criticized the Court for enabling corporations to “opt out of any
law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious
beliefs.” Id. at 2787. Ginsburg also criticized the Court’s disregard of “the impact that
[an] accommodation [of a for-profit corporation’s religious beliefs] may have on third
parties who do not share the corporation owners’ religious faith . . . .” Id. Finally, Gins-
burg warned against an expansion of claims for religious exemptions. Id. at 2797
(“[T]he Court’s expansive notion of corporate personhood—combined with its other er-
rors in construing RFRA—invites for-profit entities to seek religion-based exemptions
from regulations they deem offensive to their faith.”).
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it calls for exceptionalism. This Article focuses on two areas in the Culture
Wars where Faith-Based Emergency Powers have emerged: marriage equal-
ity and the so-called “Contraceptives Mandate” in the Affordable Care Act
(ACA). In both contexts, conservatives have declared a crisis or an emer-
gency to religion shortly after sexual minorities and women were granted
liberal rights. In particular, the right to marry was met with the legislative
response of exemptions for those who oppose same-sex marriage, and the
access to reproductive healthcare enacted in the ACA was met with Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) challenges.
The First Amendment Defense Act (FADA), introduced in Congress in
2015,18 prohibits the government from discriminating against anyone who
“believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction
that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one
woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.”19
If passed, FADA will legally condone actions against same-sex marriages.20
Several state legislatures have enacted legislation that traces the principles of
FADA (hereinafter “mini-FADAs”). A 2015 North Carolina statute for ex-
ample, exempts magistrates and register of deeds employees from perform-
ing marriages if they have religious objections to same-sex marriages.21
18 See First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015); First Amend-
ment Defense Act, S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015). The House version of FADA is spon-
sored by Representative Raul Labrador of Idaho, was originally cosponsored by 57 other
representatives, and currently has 172 cosponsors. See H.R. 2802. The Senate version of
FADA is sponsored by Senator Mike Lee of Utah, was originally cosponsored by 18 other
senators, and currently has 37 cosponsors. See S. 1598.
19 H.R. 2802 at § 3(a); S. 1598 at § 3(a).
20 So-called “discriminatory acts” by the federal government include alteration of tax
treatment, disallowing tax deductions, denying federal grants, loans, or other similar sta-
tus, denying federal benefits, or “otherwise discriminating against a person.” See H.R.
2802 at § 3(b); S. 1598 at § 3(b) (emphasis added). The FADA also creates a cause of
action for people who feel that they have been discriminated against and waives all ad-
ministrative remedy requirements. See H.R. 2802 at § 4(a)–(c); S. 1598 at § 4(a)–(c).
Then-Presidential candidate Donald Trump announced in fall of 2016 that he would “sign
it [FADA] to protect the deeply held religious beliefs of Catholics and the beliefs of
Americans of all faiths . . . .” Issues of Importance to Catholics, DONALD TRUMP CAM-
PAIGN (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/issues-of-impor-
tance-to-catholics [https://perma.cc/R5PZ-WGMW]; see also Religious Liberty and H.R.
2802, the First Amendment Defense Act: Hearing on H.R. 2802 Before the H. Comm. on
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 44–60 (2016) [hereinafter Statement of Kathe-
rine Franke] (statement of Katherine Franke, Professor, Columbia Law School, arguing
that some leading scholars find FADA both unnecessary and harmful).
21 See S. 2, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 51-5.5 (N.C. 2015); see also Beth Wal-
ton, N.C. OKs Gay Marriage Religious Exemption, USA TODAY (June 12, 2015, 1:55
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/06/12/nc-religious-exemption-
gay-marriage-bill-now-law/71107584/ [https://perma.cc/5PP8-H7WH]. This law re-
quires state employees who opt out of same-sex marriages to abstain from performing
marriages for at least six months. This legislation was a response to a federal court ruling
that struck down North Carolina’s 2012 ban on same-sex marriage. In the floor debate, a
sponsor of the bill criticized “some wise old judges that think they know better than us
that they know more than God.” Jonathan M. Katz, North Carolina Allows Officials to
Refuse to Perform Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
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Texas legislation, introduced on the day that Obergefell was decided, allows
clergy members to refuse to officiate marriages that violate their beliefs.22 In
2015, a bill was proposed in Alabama that would exempt those authorized to
solemnize marriages from performing same-sex marriages if it violated their
religious beliefs.23 In Oklahoma as well, similar legislation was introduced in
2015 but failed to pass.24 In 2016, the First Amendment Defense Act of
Georgia, which mirrors the federal versions, was referred to a subcommit-
tee.25 The common thread in this type of legislation is clear: it carves excep-
tions for religious or moral dissenters from a new liberal norm that allegedly
threatens their religious or moral faith.
In March 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“ACA”), a hallmark of Barack Obama’s presidency.26 In order to
promote gender equality,27 the ACA required employers to offer female em-
ployees “minimum essential [reproductive] coverage” including “preven-
tive care” (such as birth control) and “screenings” without cost-sharing
requirements like co-pays and deductibles.28 This measure has come to be
2015/06/12/us/north-carolina-allows-officials-to-refuse-to-perform-gay-marriages.html
[https://perma.cc/567N-R9PK].
22 See Lauren McGaughy, After Indiana Backlash, Cracks Appear in Texas ‘Religious
Freedom’ Proposals, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle
.com/news/politics/texas/article/After-Indiana-backlash-cracks-appear-in-Texas-6173647
.php [https://perma.cc/BP6G-S72C]. Before that, several other controversial bills failed,
such as a bill that would have allowed anyone to refuse to provide goods or services to
any person based on a sincerely held religious belief or on conscientious grounds. See,
e.g., H.R. 2553, 84th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
23 See H.R. 56, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015). The bill failed.
24 See H.R 1371, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) (exempting companies from par-
ticipation “in any marriage ceremony, celebration, or other related activity or to provide
items or services for such purposes against the person’s religious beliefs”); see also
Amendment Would Require Oklahoma Businesses to Bring Religious Beliefs Out of the
Closet, KFOR (Mar. 11, 2015), http://kfor.com/2015/03/11/amendment-would-require-
oklahoma-businesses-to-bring-religious-beliefs-out-of-the-closet [https://perma.cc/EGJ4-
DJ5Q].
25 See S. 284, 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016); see also H.R. 401, 2016 Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2016) (providing immunity to people and religious organizations that refuse to pro-
vide medical or other services based on their beliefs; the bill died in subcommittee).
26 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 124 Stat.
119, 119 (2010); see also Mike DeBonis, The Political Price of Obamacare, WASH. POST
(Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/obama-legacy/oba
macare.html [https://perma.cc/Z2QU-R7QC] (“One word—‘Obamacare’—would come
to represent the promise and the pitfalls of Obama’s presidency.”); see generally Noa
Ben-Asher, Obligatory Health, 15 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2012) (arguing that a
society committed to equality may need to require individuals to contribute to the greater
societal good).
27 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787–806 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
28 See Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Coverage, I.R.C. § 5000A(f)(2)
(2012); Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, I.R.C.
§ 4980H(a)–(c)(2) (2012); Coverage of Preventative Health Services, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13(a)(4) (2012). Congress authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration
(HRSA), a component of HHS, to name the types of preventive care that must be cov-
ered. The HRSA promulgated the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, which pro-
vided that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide “coverage, without
cost sharing” for “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive
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known as the “Contraceptives Mandate.”29 In Hobby Lobby, employers who
sought religious exemptions from the mandate prevailed when the Supreme
Court held that the Contraceptives Mandate (as applied to for-profit, closely
held corporations) violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(“RFRA”).30 The Court reasoned that “if the owners comply with the HHS
[Department of Health and Human Services] mandate, they believe they
will be facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very
heavy price.”31 Further legal challenges followed,32 and when President
Trump was elected, he quickly signed an executive order that instructed the
executive branch “to vigorously enforce Federal law’s robust protections for
religious freedom,”33 and “consider issuing amended regulations . . . to ad-
dress conscience-based objections to the preventive-care mandate.”34 As in
the context of marriage equality, the gist of the conservative position here is
that a liberal rule that offends the religious faith of individuals (or corpora-
tions) should be suspended for them.
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I demonstrates the use of war
and emergency rhetoric by conservatives in the Culture Wars, in particular, a
“war on Christians and Christianity.” Part II contends that the real conse-
quence of religious exemptions is suspending or limiting the legally valid
methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.” Updating the
HRSA-Supported Women’s Preventive Service Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,148, 95,149
(Dec. 27, 2016).
29 For a brief history of the Contraceptives Mandate, see Patricia A. Moran, The Af-
fordable Care Act’s Contraceptive Mandate: A Loss in Massachusetts and Other Current
Events, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/affordable-
care-act-s-contraceptive-mandate-loss-massachusetts-and-other-current [https://perma.cc/
JP7V-UBG7].
30 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2751. RFRA prohibits the “[g]overnment [from]
substantially burden[ing] a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-3(a) (2012).
31 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. For critical analysis of the decision to recognize
the religious conscience of corporations, see generally Amy Sepinwall, Corporate Piety
and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corpora-
tion, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173 (2015) (analyzing the decision to recognize the religious
conscience of corporations); Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious
Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59 (2013) (providing a broader
foundation to think about how and whether profit-making businesses and their owners
can exercise religion); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’
Amicus Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1 (2014)
(critiquing corporate law professors’ amicus brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood).
But see cases cited infra note 32. R
32 See, e.g., Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d
422, 444 (3d Cir. 2015); Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794
F.3d 1151, 1151 (10th Cir. 2015); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell, 793 F.3d 449, 449
(5th Cir. 2015); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2015);
Mich. Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372, 372 (6th Cir. 2014); Priests for Life
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 772 F.3d 229, 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded these decisions in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct.
1557, 1559 (2016).
33 Promoting Free Speech and Religious Liberty, Exec. Order No. 13,798, 82 Fed.
Reg. 21,675 (May 4, 2017).
34 Id.
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rights of women and sexual minorities. Part III discusses the endgame of
using emergency powers as a strategy: deference to religious dissenters. Part
IV argues that, in addition to harming third parties, Faith-Based Emergency
Powers pose a serious threat to the rule of law and should be resisted in two
ways: (1) contesting the factual reality of the emergency (Part IV.A), and;
(2) refusing to grant deference to religious dissenters (Part IV.B).
I. RHETORIC OF WAR AND EMERGENCY
On September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush declared: “Today,
our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a
series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts.”35 This notion of “global attack
on America” was widely accepted and adopted by many courts, policymak-
ers, and scholars faced with legal issues concerning executive powers in the
twenty-first century. In Boumediene v. Bush, the late Justice Scalia observed
that “America is at war with radical Islamists . . . . On September 11, 2001,
the enemy brought the battle to American soil . . . . It has threatened further
attacks against our homeland; . . . the threat is a serious one.”36 Scholars and
policymakers who have advocated for robust executive powers in the War on
Terror have repeatedly emphasized that America is under attack.37
In the Culture Wars, conservatives have promoted a nearly identical
rhetoric of injury, enmity, crisis, and emergency. This time, however, the
alleged attack is not on America: it is on Christianity. “My friends,” ex-
claimed Patrick Buchanan in the 1992 Republic National Convention, “this
election is about . . . what we stand for as Americans. There is a religious
war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war, as
critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War it-
35 George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 11, 2001)
(emphasis added) (transcript available online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley of
THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=58057 [https://perma.cc/EUW7-GBB7]); see also George W. Bush, Address Before a
Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of Sep-
tember 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), (transcript available online by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley of THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/in-
dex.php?pid=64731&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/P3GL-F4X6]) (“The only way to de-
feat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it
grows.” (emphasis added)); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE
FIRST 100 DAYS (2011), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm [https://perma
.cc/4RHS-SWUW] (quoting Bush as saying the attack of 9/11 “was an attack on the
heart and soul of the civilized world. And the world has come together to fight a new and
different war, the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against all
those who seek to export terror, and a war against those governments that support or
shelter them.”).
36 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 31; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, at R
15–18; Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1096–98 (2009); Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 205. R
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self.”38 This dramatic declaration followed national debates in the 1980s and
1990s about abortion, affirmative action, evolution, feminism, homosexual-
ity, school prayer, and sex education, among others.39 This new rhetoric al-
leges that liberals are attacking the “Judeo-Christian values and beliefs upon
which this nation was built.”40
Justice Scalia famously incorporated this rhetoric of war into the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence when he opened his dissent in Romer v. Evans
(1996) by condemning the majority for having “mistaken a Kulturkampf
[“culture war”] for a fit of spite.”41 At stake in Romer was Amendment 2 to
the Colorado Constitution, which repealed discrimination protections on the
basis of “homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.”42 The Court, in a decision by Justice Kennedy, held that this
was unconstitutional because it denied homosexuals “the safeguards that
others enjoy or may seek without constraint.”43 The Romer Court held that
animus toward a political group cannot motivate state legislation44 and that
Amendment 2 “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class
it affects.”45 It was in response to this idea of animus that Justice Scalia
accused the majority of mistaking Kulturkampf for spite. In other words, he
contended that Amendment 2 was not motivated by animus but by Culture
Wars: it is “rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to
preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws.”46 Thus, the idea and
rhetoric of “Culture Wars” was introduced into Supreme Court jurispru-
dence by one of the most celebrated conservative justices in the history of
the Court, in the first serious legal victory for gay rights.47
38 Patrick J. Buchanan, 1992 Republican National Convention Speech (Aug. 17,
2002) (emphasis added) (available online at PATRICK J. BUCHANAN – OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://buchanan.org/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech-148 [https://perma
.cc/S9EF-RRDF]). He continued, “[I]n that struggle for the soul of America, Clinton &
Clinton are on the other side, and George Bush is on our side. And so, we have to come
home, and stand beside him.” Id.; see also HARTMAN, supra note 2, at 1. R
39 HARTMAN, supra note 2, at 1. R
40 Buchanan, supra note 38 (“George Bush is a defender of right-to-life, and lifelong R
champion of the Judeo-Christian values and beliefs upon which this nation was built. Mr.
Clinton, however, has a different agenda.”).
41 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that
the amendment was only a “modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
those mores through use of the laws”).
42 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (1992), invalidated by Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
43 Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
44 Id. at 632.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 Id. (“In holding that homosexuality cannot be singled out for unfavorable treat-
ment, the Court contradicts . . . [Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)], and places
the prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is
as reprehensible as racial or religious bias . . . . This Court has no business . . . pronounc-
ing that ‘animosity’ toward homosexuality . . . is evil.”).
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A. Marriage Equality
The idea that Christianity is under attack by liberal politicians and
lawmakers appears explicitly or implicitly in many contemporary arguments
for religious exemptions from marriage equality.48 Rick Santorum, for in-
stance, opined in the context of same-sex marriage that “[t]he treatment of
Christians is so bad we should keep in mind Nazi Germany— . . . Jews,
obviously, but also Christians—being not just persecuted but put to death.”49
Ted Cruz said after Obergefell that “there is a liberal fascism that is dedi-
cated to going after and targeting believing Christians who follow the bibli-
cal teachings on marriage.”50 Cruz also characterized the public controversy
around state RFRA laws as “jihad that is being waged right now . . . going
after people of faith who respect the biblical teaching that marriage is the
union of one man and one woman.”51 Marco Rubio warned that “the next
step [of liberals] is to argue that the teachings of the mainstream Christian-
ity, the catechism of the Catholic Church, is hate speech and there’s real and
present danger.”52 Mike Huckabee also observed that “Christian convictions
are under attack as never before . . . in the history of this great republic . . . .
48 This perception of attack on Christianity is not new. Anti-segregation was also
critiqued by conservatives as an attack on Christianity. See, e.g., CARLETON PUTNAM,
RACE AND REASON: A YANKEE VIEW 26–28 (1961) (arguing that it would be un-Christian
to desegregate because “[t]he important thing is to recognize that the grouping instinct is
basic, and that race is one of the wider groups. To preach against its manifestations is not
only a perversion of ideals, but a very effective way of destroying a civilization.”); see
also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (quoting the trial judge’s opinion: “Almighty God
created the races . . . and he placed them on separate continents.”).
49 Sara Fischer, Santorum: Religious Persecution in U.S. Could Escalate as High as
It Did Under Nazi Germany, CNN POLITICS (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
11/02/politics/rick-santorum-religious-persecution/index.html [https://perma.cc/2JVV-
BSLF].
50 Katherine Perkins, Cruz: “Religious Liberty Unifies Us,” IOWA PUBLIC RADIO
(May 28, 2015) (emphasis added), http://iowapublicradio.org/post/cruz-religious-liberty-
unifies-us [https://perma.cc/8LXW-QRZ5].
51 Jenny Kutner, Ted Cruz: Gay Community is Waging a “Jihad” Against People of
Faith, SALON (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/04/10/ted_cruz_gay_communi
ty_is_waging_a_jihad_against_people_of_faith/ [https://perma.cc/Z2B8-NWDT].
52 Alexandra Jaffe, Rubio: Gay Marriage Proponents Pose ‘Danger’ to Christianity,
CNN (May 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/politics/rubio-gay-marriage-hate-
speech/ [https://perma.cc/9AE9-XN6T]; see also Sarah Harvard, Marco Rubio Adds
Fuel to the Christian Persecution Complex, SLATE (May 28, 2015), http://www.slate
.com/blogs/outward/2015/05/28/marco_rubio_warns_gay_rights_will_make_christianity
_hate_speech.html [https://perma.cc/36MZ-AF7V] (noting the statement of Dr. Samuel
Rodrigues of the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference: “It’s bigotry and
intolerance towards those who believe the Bible and our Judeo Christian values system
. . . . There is bigotry and intolerance, but it’s against Christians who believe in the word
of God.”); Jeff Mateer, A Ready Defense: How to Protect Your Ministry or Faith-Based
Business from Legal Attack and Ruin, FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE (May 14, 2015), https://
firstliberty.org/newsroom/a-ready-defense-how-to-protect-your-ministry-or-faith-based-
business-from-legal-attack-and-ruin/ [https://perma.cc/2H8E-LN3N] (asserting that there
is “blatant hostility toward the religious liberty rights of people of faith” and that “it’s
now open season on people of faith”).
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We are moving rapidly toward the criminalization of Christianity.”53 Con-
servative media has likewise protested the alleged media “attack” on Kim
Davis, the Kentucky clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses after
Obergefell,54 as “a real active, aggressive, anti-Christian sentiment.”55
This perception of an attack on Christianity has led to a wave of “emer-
gency” federal and state legislation. In FADA, for example, Congress finds
that protecting religious freedom today is a priority of the highest order.56
Likewise, Indiana’s RFRA explicitly states that “[a]n emergency is declared
for this act.”57 South Dakota’s RFRA claims to be “necessary for the imme-
diate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety [and] an emergency
is hereby declared to exist.” 58 Under Arkansas’s bill “an emergency is de-
clared to exist, and this act [is] immediately necessary for the preservation
of the public peace, health, and safety.”59 And Kansas Governor Sam
Brownback’s 2015 “Preservation and Protection of Religious Freedom Exec-
utive Order” bars the state from acting against any individual clergy or relig-
ious leader who declines to participate in a same-sex ceremony or any
religious group that declines to provide services for or recognize a same-sex
marriage if it conflicts with their faith or moral conviction.60 A review of this
wave of lawmaking reveals a general posture of defense and crisis.
53 Huckabee: ‘We Are Moving Rapidly Towards the Criminalization of Christianity,’
CBS DC (Apr. 29, 2015), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2015/04/29/huckabee-we-are-
moving-rapidly-towards-the-criminalization-of-christianity [https://perma.cc/4YBZ-
LYBR].
54 Paul Bremmer, Real Reason for Attack on Kim Davis? ‘Anti-Christian Sentiment’,
WORLD NET DAILY (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.wnd.com/2015/09/real-reason-for-attack-
on-kim-davis-anti-christian-sentiment/#fzzjsCWQfsvDdlqJ.99/ [https://perma.cc/W379-
67BW].
55 Id. (citing Michael Brown, an author and radio host described as “a scholar who
writes on the ‘gay’-rights movement”).
56 See First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 2(4) (2015).
57 H.R. 1632, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ind. 2015); S. 568, 119th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ind. 2015).
58 H.R. 1220, Legis. Assemb., 19th Sess. § 5 (S.D. 2015).
59 S. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2015) (“An act to Amend Arkan-
sas Law Concerning the Free Exercise of Religion; To enact the religious freedom Resto-
ration Act; [and] To Declare an Emergency . . . .”).
60 See Kan. Exec. Order No. 15-05 (July 7, 2015) (“WHEREAS, the recent imposi-
tion of same sex marriage by the United States Supreme Court poses potential infringe-
ments on the civil right of religious liberty.”). The governor explained: “Today’s
executive order protects Kansas clergy and religious organizations from being forced to
participate in activities that violate their sincerely and deeply held beliefs.” Sean Ken-
nedy, Governor Sam Brownback Issues Executive Order Protecting the Religious Free-
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B. The ACA
Measures and rhetoric of emergency also appeared in challenges to the
Contraceptives Mandate of the ACA.61 In Wheaton College, for example, the
Supreme Court granted an emergency injunction to a nonprofit liberal arts
college that objected to the self-certification form (a form that institutions
eligible for exemption had to file with HHS to receive the exemption).62 An
emergency injunction stops a party from continuing to perform an action
before a judge has issued an opinion on the dispute.63 Justice Sotomayor’s
sharp dissent criticized the injunction,64 stressing that “Wheaton’s applica-
tion comes nowhere near the high bar necessary to warrant an emergency
injunction from this Court.”65 Such injunctions, writes Sotomayor, “are
proper only where ‘the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear . . . . Yet
the Court today orders this extraordinary relief even though no one could
credibly claim Wheaton’s right to relief is indisputably clear.’” 66 Plaintiffs
and supportive parties nonetheless relied on ideas of crisis and emergency in
briefs submitted in Zubik v. Burwell.67 One amicus curiae brief claimed that
“HHS’s attack on Catholic religious expression is all the more unjustifiable
because it serves no compelling government interest,”68 and that “HHS’s
clumsy and needless assault on Catholic religious institutes—and thus on the
Catholic Church itself—‘would effectively exclude [them] from full partici-
pation in the economic life of the Nation.’” 69 Another amicus curiae brief
implied that the threat imposed by HHS could even be life threatening for
61 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767 (2014) (stating that
the government’s position would have “dramatic consequences,” and that individuals will
be forced to “either give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty
or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations”).
62 See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (holding that
Wheaton was not required to file the form as long as it notices the Secretary of HHS in
writing of its exemption request).
63 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
64 Wheaton College, 134 S. Ct. at 2807–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 2809. Sotomayor adds that at stake is “a form of relief as rare as it is ex-
treme: an interlocutory injunction under the All Writs Act . . . blocking the operation of a
duly enacted law and regulations, in a case in which the courts below have not yet adju-
dicated the merits of the applicant’s claims and in which those courts have declined
requests for similar injunctive relief.” Id. at 2808 (emphasis added) (internal citations
omitted).
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., Brief for Carmelite Sisters of the Most Sacred Heart of Los Angeles, et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016)
(No. 14-1418) [hereinafter Carmelite Sisters Brief]; Brief for United States Conference
of Catholic Bishops et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners and Supporting Rever-
sal, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418) [hereinafter Catholic As-
sociations Brief]; Brief for Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No. 14-1418) [herein-
after Religious Groups Brief].
68 See Carmelite Sisters Brief, supra note 67, at 8 (emphasis added). R
69 See id. at 27 (citation omitted).
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religious dissenters.70 This emphasis on the perils of submitting an exemp-
tion form to a federal agency nicely illustrates the larger strategic shift of
conservatives in the Culture Wars.
The commonalities between emergency rhetoric in the War on Terror
and in the Culture Wars are indisputable. In both cases, conservatives have
framed historical events (small or large) in terms of injury, enmity, crisis,
and emergency. Consequently, in both “wars,” as we will now see, the
emergency framework offers the foundation for the sought after legal conse-
quence: suspension or limiting of human rights.71
II. SUSPENDING OR LIMITING HUMAN RIGHTS
In the War on Terror, the conservative strategy has been to suspend or
limit existing human rights in real or perceived emergencies.72 President
Trump’s controversial “Muslim Ban” executive order illustrates this strat-
egy. It alleges that a threat to national security, posed by Muslim terrorists,
justifies the limiting and suspension of human rights of many individuals.73
The Ban, which suspends entry into the United States of immigrants and
non-immigrants from several countries with significant Muslim populations,
was immediately challenged for unlawfully suspending statutory and consti-
tutional rights, including Due Process and Equal Protection.74 The Ban’s fate
is still in the hand of federal courts, but the arguments made by the govern-
70 See Catholic Associations Brief, supra note 67, at 2 (“History is replete with in- R
stances in which an individual went to his or her death to avoid committing an act objec-
tionable to the individual on religious grounds, though thought by others to be
innocuous.”); see also Religious Groups Brief, supra note 67, at 5–6 (“If government R
actors have carte blanche to re-examine the veracity of religious beliefs, the rights of
adherents to minority religions will be in even greater peril.”).
71 See Legalism and Decisionism, supra note 7, at 731–33. R
72 See id. at 733–35; Legal Holes, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing Vermeule, supra note R
9, at 1096); see also, e.g., POSNER, supra note 9, at 3; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 9, R
at 15–18; Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1096–98 (2009); Ku & Yoo, supra note 9, at 205. R
73 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (stating that the purpose
of the order is allegedly to “protect the American people from terrorist attacks by foreign
nationals . . . .”), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017)
(stating the same purpose as in Exec. Order. No. 13,769), amended by Effective Date in
Exec. Order 13,780: Memorandum for the Secretary of State[,] the Attorney General[,]
the Secretary of Homeland Security[, and] the Director of National Intelligence, 82 Fed.
Reg. 27,965 (June 14, 2017).
74 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at 2, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 28, 2017). Act-
ing Attorney General Sally Yates refused to defend the order and was removed from
office. See Lydia Wheeler, Acting Attorney General Orders DOJ Not to Defend Trump’s
Travel Ban, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/
316990-justice-department-wont-defend-trump-immigration-order [https://perma.cc/
Z5JJ-PKZH]; Jonathan H. Adler, Acting Attorney General Orders Justice Department
Attorneys Not to Defend Immigration Executive Order, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/
01/30/acting-attorney-general-orders-justice-department-attorneys-not-to-defend-immi-
gration-executive-order/?utm_term=.e17be1836d41 [https://perma.cc/2TVS-Y4FZ].
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ment supporting it demonstrate the rationales and dangers of emergency
powers in the War on Terror.75
Likewise, in today’s Culture Wars, conservatives are using the same
legal strategy in the name of defending religious liberties. Conservative
lawmakers and scholars argue that rights of women and sexual minorities
should be suspended or limited when the exercise of those rights implicates
the conscience of religious or moral dissenters.76 Legal challenges to relig-
ious exemptions from marriage equality and the ACA’s contraceptives man-
date seek to defend these existing human rights.77
A. Marriage Equality
Statutes such as FADA and state mini-FADAs represent the growing
conservative strategy of using religious liberties as a means to suspend ex-
isting liberal antidiscrimination norms with regard to marriage equality.78
These laws carve out exceptions to valid and generally applicable liberal
norms. They effectively extend immunities to anyone who claims to object
to LGBT marriage rights on religious or other moral grounds. FADA prohib-
its the federal government from penalizing those who refuse to recognize
same-sex marriages.79 FADA, if enacted, will be a de facto statutory suspen-
sion of the right to marry recognized in Obergefell.80 It will enable individu-
als and other entities to ignore the right to marry without legal consequences
under federal law.81 State mini-FADAs and some state RFRAs do the same.82
Their primary purpose is to suspend marriage equality and other antidis-
crimination protections for LGBT individuals when there are religious or
moral objections to them.83
75 The Government’s initial argument alleged a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because the States did not have standing to sue. Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151,
1158 (9th Cir. 2017). More importantly, it contended that the court does not have the
authority to enjoin the enforcement of the Muslim Ban because the President has “unre-
viewable authority to suspend the admissions of any class of aliens.” Id. at 1161 (quota-
tions omitted) (emphasis added). The government also asserted that immigration and
national security policy determinations of the executive branch were categorically unre-
viewable even if they violated rights and protections afforded by the Constitution. Id.
76 See discussion supra Part I.
77 See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (religious organizations
seeking exemption to contraceptive mandate).
78 See discussion supra Part I.
79 First Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015).
80 See H.R. 2802 § 3 (“The Federal Government shall not take any discriminatory
action against a person, wholly or partially on the basis that such person believes or acts
in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be
recognized as the union of one man and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly
reserved to such a marriage.”). See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (holding that same-sex couples had constitutional right to marriage).
81 See H.R. 2802 § 3.
82 See S. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2015).
83 The shift from Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to FADA represents an impor-
tant shift in conservative law and politics from rule-making to exception-making. There is
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Several state legislatures have similarly attempted to suspend or limit
human rights. Mississippi’s mini-FADA provides that “the state government
shall not take any discriminatory action” against those who act in accor-
dance with certain religious or moral beliefs, including that “(a) marriage is
or should be recognized as the union of one man or one woman; (b) [s]exual
relations are properly reserved to such a marriage; and (c) [m]ale (man) or
female (woman) refer[s] to an individual’s immutable biological sex as ob-
jectively determined by anatomy and genetics at time of birth.”84 Under this
statute, anyone acting or claiming to act under one of these beliefs is im-
mune from adverse legal consequences, including penalties relating to tax,
benefits, employment decisions, fines, and occupational licenses.85 The Fifth
Circuit recently dismissed a constitutional challenge to this legislation on
procedural grounds, holding that the LGBT and unmarried plaintiffs did not
have standing because they could not show an injury-in-fact, and stigmatic
injury did not suffice.86
Other states have similarly provided statutory exemptions for religious
dissenters who oppose LGBT rights. Indiana’s RFRA (2015) permits “large
corporations, if they are substantially owned by members with strong relig-
ious convictions, to claim that a ruling or mandate violates their religious
faith.”87 After the law drew harsh criticism,88 the legislature amended it to
an important jurisprudential difference between the DOMA and FADA. In 1996, when
DOMA was signed into law, it defined marriage for all federal purposes as a “union
between one man and one woman.” Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), inval-
idated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2675–76 (2013). DOMA created a
rule that, as evident from its title —“defense of marriage” —sought to preserve tradi-
tional marriage by defining marriage to exclude same-sex couples. Two decades later,
conservatives are utilizing a different tactic in the era of marriage equality: carving ex-
ceptions. See H.R. 2802 § 3.
84 H.R. l523, Reg. Sess. § 2 (Miss. 2016).
85 Id. § 4. The statute also creates a private right of action for those who are harmed
by such “discriminatory” state action and authorizes its use as a defense in private law-
suits regarding conduct covered by the statute. Id. § 5.
86 See Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that LGBT plain-
tiffs do not have standing to challenge the statute, and reversing the injunction issued in
their favor).
87 S. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). See also Campbell Robert-
son and Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset Capitols in Arkansas
and Indiana, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/relig-
ious-freedom-restoration-act-arkansas-indiana.html [https://perma.cc/L9KL-E7JC].
88 Major Indiana employers worried that the law would “encourage discrimination
and hurt Indiana’s reputation as a welcoming state.” Tony Cook, Indiana House OK’s
Controversial Religious Freedom Bill, USA TODAY (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.usa
today.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/23/indiana-house-oks-controversial-religious-
freedom-bill/70361050/ [https://perma.cc/GX5X-TE69]. N.C.A.A. president Mark Em-
mert said the law “strikes at the core values of what higher education in America is all
about”; business executives at companies like Apple and Yelp spoke out against the law;
Angie’s List canceled plans to expand its facilities to Indianapolis; entertainers canceled
tour dates in Indiana; a convention considered relocating; and several state governors
banned state-funded travel to Indiana. See Robertson & Pe´rez-Pen˜a, supra note 87. The R
law was, however, supported by Republican presidential contenders, Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz,
and Marco Rubio. See Eric Bradner, Republican 2016 Hopefuls Back Indiana’s ‘Relig-
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prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.89 Sim-
ilar Arkansas legislation was approved90 but the governor urged lawmakers
to repeal it and pass a statute that mirrors the federal RFRA.91 Virginia,92
North Dakota,93 and Michigan94 have enacted laws to enable private adoption
agencies to exclude individuals if serving such individuals would violate
moral or religious beliefs. Under the Michigan law, for example, child-plac-
ing agencies do not have to provide services in conflict with their “sincerely
held” religious beliefs.95 They can decline a referral for foster-care manage-
ment or adoption services without fear of an adverse legal action.96 By deny-
ing same-sex couples the access to fostering or adopting children, such laws
significantly narrow the scope of marriage equality, at least for those couples
who wish to raise children.
At the same time, public and private actors have been suspending or
limiting the right to marriage equality through individual disobedience. In
June of 2015, shortly after the Supreme Court published its decision in
Obergefell,97 a same-sex couple applied for a marriage license in Kentucky.
The county clerk, Kim Davis, refused to grant the license, claiming that it
ious Freedom’ Law, CNN (Mar. 30, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/30/politics/re-
publican-2016-candidates-back-indiana-law/ [https://perma.cc/M93Z-JM2N].
89 On April 2, 2015, just over a week after the Indiana’s RFRA was signed into law,
Governor Pence signed an amendment to the Act that clarifies that the Act does not
“authorize a provider to refuse to offer or provide services . . . to any member of the
general public on the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, age, national origin, disabil-
ity, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or United States military service.” Cook,
supra note 88. R
90 See Robertson & Pe´rez-Pen˜a, supra note 87 (“The state, according to the Arkansas R
bill, must show that a law or requirement that someone is challenging is ‘essential’ to the
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest, a word that is absent from the federal
law and those in other states, including Indiana.”).
91 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-401 (2015);
see also Zuzanna Sitek and Curt Lanning, Amended Religion Bill, Now SB 229 and SB
975, Pass Senate, Head to House, 5 NEWS: KFSM (Apr. 1, 2015), http://5newsonline
.com/2015/04/01/amended-religion-bill-passes-senate-committee/ [https://perma.cc/
9F8A-F66Y]; Monica Davey, Campbell Robertson, & Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Indiana and
Arkansas Revise Rights Bills, Seeking to Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES (April 2,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-arkansas-religious-freedom-bill
.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/T6X9-P2V7] (“The uproar had spread to Arkansas on
Tuesday, when lawmakers approved a bill similar to Indiana’s legislation. Walmart, the
state’s biggest corporation, urged the governor to use his veto, and a host of civic groups
and other businesses condemned the legislation.”).
92 See VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1709.3 (2012).
93 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-12-07.1 (2003).
94 See Act 53, H.R. 4188, 98th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015); Act 54, H.R. 4189,
98th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015); Act 55, H.R. 4190, 98th Legis., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2015).
95 See bills cited supra note 94. R
96 Margot Cleveland, Michigan Tolerates Faith-Based Adoption Agencies, the ACLU
Sues, NAT. REV. (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/09/american-
civil-liberties-union-michigan-law-adoption-agencies-same-sex-couples-religious-beliefs/
, [https://perma.cc/HH4L-LWC8] (“Michigan’s law . . . allows child-placement agencies
to offer foster and adoption services consistent with the organizations’ deeply held relig-
ious beliefs.”).
97 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2584 (2015).
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would violate her religious beliefs.98 Davis persisted even after a Kentucky
District Court ordered her to issue the marriage licenses99 and was jailed for
contempt of court.100 Davis became a popular figure among GOP candidates
in the 2016 election primary season and was even honored by the Pope.101
Other public officials and judges have followed in Davis’s footsteps.102
Private individuals and businesses have also publicly resisted marriage-
equality. In several well-publicized incidents throughout the past few years,
private businesses have refused to bake cakes, rent out venues, or provide
photography for same-sex weddings.103 As in Hobby Lobby, these businesses
typically argue that participating in a same-sex wedding violates their relig-
98 See Alan Blinder & Richard Pe´rez-Pen˜a, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Mar-
riage Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/02/us/same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html?smid=pl-share [https://per
ma.cc/NJW9-32FA]; Ed Payne, Who is Kentucky Clerk Kim Davis?, CNN (Sept. 4,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/04/us/kentucky-clerk-kim-davis/index.html [https://
perma.cc/5FDS-9DMQ] (“To issue a marriage license which conflicts with God’s defini-
tion of marriage, with my name affixed to that certificate, would violate my conscience.
It is not a light issue for me. It is a heaven or hell decision.”).
99 See Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 925 (E.D. Ky. 2015). On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit refused to extend the stay and held that “[i]t cannot be defensibly argued
that the holder of the Rowan County clerk’s office, apart from who personally occupies
that office, may decline to act in conformity with the United States Constitution as inter-
preted by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.” Ermold v. Davis,
855 F.3d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 2017).
100 See, e.g., Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail Over
Deal on Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/09/04/us/kim-davis-same-sex-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/E3GL-V4P6].
101 Francis X. Clines, The Pope Sought Out Kim Davis for a Blessing, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2015), https://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/the-pope-sought-out-
kim-davis-for-a-blessing/ [https://perma.cc/W4WP-NATR].
102 See, e.g., Matt Okarmus, Judge Ends Courthouse Weddings after Same-Sex Rul-
ing, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/02/
06/ala-judge-ends-courthouse-weddings-after-same-sex-ruling/23018941 [https://perma
.cc/NL67-ZVU4]; Jay Reeves, Some Alabama Judges Not Issuing Any Marriage Li-
censes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/us/arti-
cles/2015/10/03/alabama-judges-use-segregation-era-law-to-avoid-gay-marriage [https://
perma.cc/B6LT-DVQQ]; Seam Moody, Group Rallies Behind Whitley Clerk’s Decision
Not to Grant Same-sex Marriage Licenses, WKYT (July 8, 2015), http://www.wkyt.com/
home/headlines/Group-rallies-behind-Whitley-clerks-decision-not-to-grant-same-sex-
marriage-licenses-312653641.html [https://perma.cc/L6UR-MN6U]; Alastair Jamieson,
Kentucky Clerk Casey Davis Ordered to Comply With Law on Gay Marriage, NBC NEWS
(July 10, 2015), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kentucky-clerk-casey-davis-or-
dered-comply-law-gay-marriage-n389851 [https://perma.cc/FK4Q-GARB].
103 See, e.g., Sarah Larimer, Colorado Court Sides Against Baker who Cited Relig-
ious Beliefs, Refused Same-Sex Marriage Cake Order, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/08/13/colorado-court-
sides-against-baker-who-cited-religious-beliefs-refused-same-sex-couple/?utm_term=.fb
f1505d3ab7 [https://perma.cc/XHA2-CQXK]; Bradford Richardson, Sweet Cakes by
Melissa Files Appeal in Oregon Gay Wedding Cake Case, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/apr/26/sweet-cakes-melissa-files-appeal-or-
egon-gay-weddin/ [https://perma.cc/KK8S-2GQ4]; Valerie Richardson, New York Farm
Owners Give Up Legal Fight After Being Fined $13,000 for Refusing to Host Gay Wed-
ding, WASH. TIMES (Feb 23, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/feb/23/
robert-cynthia-giffords-give-legal-fight-over-same/ [https://perma.cc/SC3G-7NVP].
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ious faith and makes them accomplices in sin.104 So far, private businesses
have been relatively unsuccessful at resisting state antidiscrimination laws
when it comes to marriage rights.105 However, the Supreme Court recently
heard the case of a Denver baker who refused to sell a wedding cake to a
same-sex couple in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Com-
mission.106 The question before the Court is whether “applying Colorado’s
public accommodations law to compel [baker] to create expression that vio-
lates his sincerely held religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free
Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.”107 This is a sig-
nificant case for the future of marriage equality and LGBT rights.
B. The ACA
Faith-based challenges to the Contraceptives Mandate in the ACA have
successfully suspended legal reproductive rights in the Culture Wars.108 In
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court effectively suspended the Contraceptives
Mandate (as applied to the plaintiffs) when it held that compliance with the
104 Victoria Childress, owner of an Iowa-based bakery, stated that the decision had
“to do with [him] and [his] walk with God and what [he] answer Him for.” Oregon
Bakery Owner Aaron Klein Denies Lesbian Couple a Wedding Cake, HUFF. POST: QUEER
VOICES (Feb 4, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/aaron-klein-oregon-
bakery-owner-lesbian-wedding-cake_n_2615563.html [https://perma.cc/3ULN-XZR8].
Jack Phillips, who also refused to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, stated that
he “honors God through his creative work by declining to use his artistic talents to design
and create cakes that violate his religious beliefs.” Jordan Steffen, Baker Who Won’t
Make Gay Wedding Cake Appeals to Colorado Supreme Court, DENVER POST: BUS. (Oct.
23, 2015), http://www.denverpost.com/2015/10/23/baker-who-wont-make-gay-wedding-
cake-appeals-to-colorado-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/M3BQ-2K3L].
105 See, e.g., Elaine Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 62 (N.M. 2013)
(holding that the application of Public Accommodations Law to wedding photography
company does not violate First Amendment speech protections); Mullins v. Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 280–81 (Colo. App. 2015) (holding that a cake shop
owner’s refusal to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on religious beliefs
violated Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act); Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 37
(N.Y. 2016) (holding that refusal to allow a same-sex couple to host a wedding ceremony
at venue violated New York human rights law); State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d
543, 552–53 (Wash. 2017) (holding that flower shop owner’s refusal to provide flowers
for a same-sex wedding violated the State of Washington anti-discrimination law).
106 See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 370 P.3d
272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (holding that cake shop
owner’s refusal to create cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado’s public accom-
modation law).
107 See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Case on Religious Objections to Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/politics/
supreme-court-wedding-cake-gay-couple-masterpiece-cakeshop.html [https://perma.cc/
8TKH-UUWM]; see also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court to Take Case on Baker Who




108 See discussion supra Part I.
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ACA would violate RFRA.109 In Zubik, the challenge to the exemption form
was another attempt to suspend the Contraceptives Mandate because if ex-
emption forms in-and-of-themselves violate RFRA, HHS would have a hard
time administering the Mandate.110 As several scholars have observed, these
religious exemptions harm the legally recognized rights of third parties.111
Through the use of religious exemptions, the access of many female employ-
ees to reproductive care is limited.112 President Trump’s executive order re-
garding the ACA effectively suspended the rights embodied in the statute by
instructing HHS to “exercise all authority and discretion available to them to
waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation of any
provision or requirement of the [ACA] that would impose a fiscal burden on
any State . . . .”113
The strategy of suspending or limiting existing legal rights (Step II),
which relies on rhetoric of enmity, catastrophe, and emergency (Step I), is a
key component of conservative law and politics both in the War on Terror
109 See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (hold-
ing that religious beliefs of owners could exempt closely-held corporation exempt from
regulation).
110 Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1559 (2016) (arguing [by petitioners] that the
form exempting corporations from the contraceptive mandate would “substantially bur-
den[ ] the exercise of their religion, in violation of [RFRA]”).
111 See generally Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations
Laws: Four Reasons to Say No, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177 (2015) (arguing against
allowing religious exemptions in anti-discrimination measures); Douglas Nejaime &
Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity Based Conscience Claims in Religion and
Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015) (arguing that religious exemptions prolong conflict
instead of finding solutions); Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable
Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil
Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463 (2015) (arguing that religious exemptions are unconstitu-
tional); Amy Sepinwall, Conscience And Complicity, supra note 15, (arguing that relig- R
ious exemptions impose a substantial burden on third parties); Nancy J. Knauer,
Religious Exemptions, Marriage Equality, and the Establishment of Religion, 84 UKMC
L. REV. 749 (2016) (arguing that religious exemptions “are not consistent with our tradi-
tion of religious liberty or civil rights protections”).
112 See generally MARY ANNE CASE, A PATCHWORK ARRAY OF THEOCRATIC
FIEFDOMS? RFRA CLAIMS AGAINST THE ACA’S CONTRACEPTION MANDATE AS EXAM-
PLES OF THE NEW FEUDALISM, in LAW, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES
(Holly Fernandez Lynch, I. Cohen & Elizabeth Sepper eds., 2017) (discussing a case of a
father who opted out of reproductive health coverage for his daughters).
113 Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351 (Jan. 20, 2017). According to Section
1 of the order, Trump’s administration seeks “the prompt repeal of the [ACA] . . . .
[P]ending such repeal, it is imperative for the executive branch to ensure that the law is
being efficiently implemented, take all actions consistent with law to minimize the un-
warranted economic and regulatory burdens of the Act, and prepare to afford the States
more flexibility and control to create a more free and open healthcare market.” Id. Since
President Trump was elected in 2016, among the first professed tasks of Congress has
been to repeal the ACA. See Susan Cornwell & David Morgan, Republicans Lay out
Plans for Obamacare Repeal, REUTERS (Jan 26, 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-congress-republicans-idUSKBN159174 [https://perma.cc/84XF-PM5G]; Kelsey
Snell & Mike DeBonis, Republicans Set Aggressive Agenda on Health Care, Regulations
and Tax Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/wp/2017/01/25/republicans-set-aggressive-agenda-on-health-care-regulations-
and-tax-reform/?utm_term=.d1c8d046a749 [https://perma.cc/RAG9-YU3K].
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and in the Culture Wars. Suspending or limiting human rights sets the stage
for the endgame of conservative politics, in which the designated author-
ity—the President in the War on Terror and the religious or moral dissenter
in the Culture Wars—can make decisions outside existing legal norms.
III. CLAIMING DEFERENCE TO RELIGIOUS DISSENTERS
It is well-known that whoever obtains judicial deference on a given
legal matter will usually become the actual decider of that dispute.114 Thus,
the third and final step in Faith-Based Emergency Powers framework is the
claim that lawmakers and courts must defer to religious dissenters in matters
relating to the intersection between liberal rights and religious convictions.
In the War on Terror, conservatives have argued that the executive branch is
the proper decision-maker in emergencies and that other branches of govern-
ment and the public should defer to it.115 In the Culture Wars, conservatives
argue for judicial deference to individual religious dissenters. In both of
these contexts, conservatives argue for legal deference to a decision-maker
who can properly respond to the perceived emergency.
As this Part shows, such claims for deference in the Culture Wars have
been successful in some areas, and less so in others. Nonetheless, conserva-
tives continue to seek deference to religious dissenters across the board with
the explicit goal of placing greater decision-making power in the hands of
Christian religious dissenters and lesser decision-making power in the hands
of liberal antidiscrimination laws and lawmakers. What follows is an exami-
nation of the claim to judicial deference to religious dissenters in two con-
texts: (1) marriage equality; and (2) the ACA.
114 See Vermeule, supra note 9, at 1096. See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL R
THEOLOGY (George Schwab ed. and trans., Univ. of Chicago Press Books 2005) (1985)
(arguing that in national security emergencies, the President and the executive branch
should get full deference from the rest of the political system, and that this is a sign of
true sovereignty).
115 See generally David Dyzenhaus, Schmitt v. Dicey: Are States of Emergency In-
side or Outside the Legal Order?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2005 (2006) (arguing that states
of emergency are inside the legal order and must be governed by the rule of law); David
Abraham, The Bush Regime from Elections to Detentions: A Moral Economy of Carl
Schmitt and Human Rights, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 249 (2008) (examining the sacrifice of
legal norms in the name of the War on Terror under the Bush Administration). This same
claim was made by the state department on February 3, 2017, when a federal court in
Washington issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the executive order that instated an
Immigration Ban on immigrants from seven predominantly Muslim Countries. See
Homeland Security Suspends Actions Associated with Trump’s Travel Ban; ‘Standard Pol-
icy’ Now in Effect, CNBC (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/03/seattle-fed-
eral-judge-grants-temporary-restraining-order-on-immigration-ban-on-nationwide-basis
.html [https://perma.cc/4KF9-VXT9].
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A. Marriage Equality
Securing deference to religious dissenters who oppose marriage equal-
ity and other LGBT rights has been a priority for conservative politicians
and lawmakers.116 Codifying deference to religious dissenters is goal of
FADA and the various state legislation that appeared after Obergefell.117
However, courts have proven to be a difficult barrier for these religious dis-
senters to overcome. For example, a Kentucky court ruled that under the
Kentucky Religious Freedom Act, country clerk Kim Davis was not substan-
tially burdened by issuing marriage licenses because she was not asked “to
condone same-sex unions on moral or religious grounds, nor [did] [the
state] restrict[ ] her from engaging in a variety of religious activities.”118
The court did not defer to Davis on what constitutes “substantial burden” on
religion: it found that “her religious convictions [did not] excuse her from
performing the duties that she took an oath to perform . . . .”119
Several state courts have likewise declined to defer to private busi-
nesses who refused to provide services related to same-sex marriages. When
a cake shop in Denver refused to sell a wedding cake to a same-sex couple
by claiming that it violated the owner’s religious beliefs, a Colorado court
held that the bakery must comply with the state’s public accommodations
law.120 A Washington court also declined to defer to a florist who violated
the state’s anti-discrimination law by denying service to a same-sex wed-
ding.121 A New York court determined that petitioners who owned and oper-
ated a farm used as a wedding venue unlawfully discriminated against a
116 Legislation has proven to be an oft-used avenue for these attempts. See, e.g., First
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015); see also S. 2, 2015 Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. § 51-5.5 (N.C. 2015) (providing state employees who opt out of same-
sex marriages to abstain from performing marriages for at least six months.); H.R 1371,
55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) (exempting companies from participation “in any mar-
riage ceremony, celebration, or other related activity or to provide items or services for
such purposes against the person’s religious beliefs”); S. 284, 2015–16 Reg. Sess. (Ga.
2016); H.R. 401, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2016) (providing immunity to people and relig-
ious organizations that refuse to provide medical or other services based on their beliefs;
the bill died in subcommittee).
117 See legislation cited supra note 116.
118 Miller v. Davis, 123 F. Supp. 3d 924, 944 (E.D. Ky. 2015). On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that “[i]t cannot be defensibly argued that the holder of the Rowan County
clerk’s office . . . may decline to act in conformity with the United States Constitution as
interpreted by a dispositive holding of the United States Supreme Court.” Ermold v.
Davis, 855 F.3d 715, 717 (6th Cir. 2017).
119 Id.
120 See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 370 P.3d
272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (holding that cake shop
owner’s refusal to create cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado’s public accom-
modation law). In this case, Defendants relied on the Free Exercise clause of the First
Amendment as well as Article II § 7 of the Colorado Constitution. See id. at 288.
121 See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 534, 567 (Wash. 2017) (holding that
plaintiff’s refusal to sell flowers to the couple violates Washington’s Law against Discrim-
ination and the Consumer Protection Act).
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same-sex couple by denying them services.122 Finally, a Massachusetts court
held that a Catholic school that rescinded an offer of employment to a gay
candidate who was married violated the state’s employment antidiscrimina-
tion laws.123 In these cases, challengers asked courts to defer to their relig-
ious faith when it allegedly conflicted with state anti-discrimination laws,
and the courts refused.124
The Supreme Court, however, has recently held oral arguments in Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop, the case of the Denver baker who refused to sell a wed-
ding cake to a same-sex couple.125 This case turns on deference to religious
dissenters who wish to override state anti-discrimination laws.126 If the Court
offers the kind of deference to religious dissenters that it offered the plain-
tiffs in Hobby Lobby, religious law could trump secular law in matters of
discrimination against LGBT individuals in the United States. That is pre-
122 See Gifford v. McCarthy, 137 A.D.3d 30, 43 (N.Y. 2016) (sustaining $1,500 in
compensatory damages to each respondent and sustaining the imposition of a $10,000
fine on petitioners). Here, the court found that the State Division of Human Rights’ deter-
mination that petitioners illegally discriminated against respondents did not violate peti-
tioners’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause or their free speech rights under the Federal
and State Constitutions. Id. at 40–43. The court justified this decision by determining that
the legislation did “not require [petitioners] to participate in the marriage of a same-sex
couple,” and that the state’s substantial interest in eradicating discrimination outweighed
the burden on petitioners’ right to freely exercise their religion. Id. at 40.
123 Barrett v. Fontbonne Academy, 33 Mass. L. Rptr. 287, *2 (Super. Ct. 2015).
Fontbonne Academy defended against the employment discrimination charge by claiming
an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause as well as the right to expressive associa-
tion under the First Amendment. Defendants also cited an expectation that “its employees
[would] model its values, including the Catholic Church’s opposition to same-sex mar-
riage.” Id. at *2. The court held that plaintiff’s employment as Food Services Director did
not sufficiently burden the school’s expression. Id. at *18. Defendants’ Free Exercise
Clause defense, which rested on the “ministerial” exception to employment discrimina-
tion laws that allow religious organizations additional leeway over their hiring decisions,
was also rejected. Id. at *19–20.
124 See generally, e.g., Welch v. Brown, 58 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (deny-
ing California mental health professionals declaratory judgment that a law that prohibits
them from providing “conversion therapy” violates their rights under the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses, reasoning that that petitioners were unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their Free Exercise and Establishment challenges).
125 See generally Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 370 P.3d
272 (Colo. App. 2015), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (holding that cake shop
owner’s refusal to create cake for a same-sex couple violated Colorado’s public accom-
modation law).
126 At oral argument, Kristen K. Waggoner, on behalf of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,
challenged the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s order forcing Masterpiece’s baker to
decorate cakes that celebrate a view of marriage “in violation of [the baker’s] religious
convictions.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n (No. 16-111), SUP. CT. OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www
.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf [https://
perma.cc/4LES-A6J5] (pending before the Court). Waggoner analogized the effects of
the Commission’s order to compelled speech. Id. at 5. She argued that if the purpose for
which the cake is to be made is not consistent with the baker’s personal views, then the
Commission cannot force the baker to use his own “artistic expression” to create the
cake. Id. at 6–8. This is because, as Waggoner claimed, “artistic expression doesn’t need
to include words and symbols to express a message or to be protected speech.” Id. at 8.
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cisely the desired outcome of conservative lawmakers pursuing Faith-Based
Emergency Powers.
B. The ACA
Hobby Lobby has rightly been viewed as a turning point in the quest for
deference to religious dissenters.127 RFRA was enacted after the Supreme
Court denied the free exercise claims of members of a Native American
Church who were dismissed from their jobs and denied unemployment bene-
fits for ingesting peyote at a religious ceremony in violation of Oregon
law.128 Justice Scalia reasoned in his majority opinion that “an individual’s
religious beliefs [do not] excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”129 “To permit
this,” he wrote, “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious be-
lief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.”130 Congress responded by passing RFRA,
which requires strict scrutiny when a neutral law of general applicability
“substantially burden[s] a person’s exercise of religion . . . .”131 RFRA’s
legislative purposes were to “restore” the test that any legislation that in-
fringes on First Amendment Rights must be justified by a compelling state
interest132 and “to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened.”133
127 See Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety, supra note 31, at 175 (describ- R
ing Hobby Lobby’s expansion of corporate rights as “unprecedented”); see also Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(“There is an overriding interest, I believe, in keeping the courts ‘out of the business of
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims . . . . The Court, I fear, has
ventured into a minefield by its immoderate reading of RFRA.”) (citations omitted).
128 See Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990);
see also Mark Tushnet, Accommodation of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1, 9–10 (2015); Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is Not a Viable Solution to the
Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil Rights, supra
note 111, at 469. R
129 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
130 Id. at 879.
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1993).
132 See id. at § 2000bb(b); see also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221
(1972) (rejecting the argument that the State’s “system of compulsory education is so
compelling that the established religious practices of the Amish must give way”).
133 In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533–534 (1997), the Court held RFRA
unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress had overstepped its Section 5
authority. Consequently, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), enacted under Congress’s Commerce and Spending
Clause powers, which imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited
category of governmental actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). Since then, many states
have enacted state versions of RFRA. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956, §42-80.1-3 (1993);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 761.03 (West 1998); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 73-402 (West 2000); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 52-571b (2001). Other states have tried but failed to enact their own RFRA
legislation. See, e.g., Montana Religious Freedom Restoration Act, H.R. 615, 64th Legis.,
2015 Sess. (Mont. 2015); Nevada Protection of Religious Freedom Act, S. 272, 2015
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In RFRA’s first two decades, courts deferred heavily to the government
regarding what constitutes a “substantial burden” to the free exercise of re-
ligion. Since the government was generally against religious exemptions,
case law leaned against deference to private actors. For example, in 1994,
anti-abortionists challenged the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE), which made it a federal crime to commit violence against or ob-
struct the operation of abortion clinics, in the federal courts.134 The Fourth
Circuit held that even if FACE substantially burdened plaintiffs’ religious
exercise, it did not violate RFRA because it “serves sufficiently compelling
government interests by the least restrictive means available.”135 In a differ-
ent case, the Fourth Circuit also denied a church’s RFRA-based claim that
children receiving vocational training were not entitled to the protections of
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because the church members “hold a
religious belief that their children should receive meaningful vocational
training.”136 In those years, federal courts applying RFRA also regularly dis-
missed prisoners’ challenges to prison policies,137 reasoning that (1) a policy
did not “substantially burden” religious faith or was not a “central tenet” of
the prisoner’s faith,138 or (2) the governmental interest was compelling or
implemented through least restrictive means.139 For instance, when prison
Legis., 78th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015); North Carolina Religious Restoration Act, S. 550,
2015 Gen. Assemb., 2015 Sess. (N.C. 2015).
134 See generally Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that: (1) Act is within power of Congress; (2) Act does not violate First Amendment’s free
speech clause; (3) Act is neither overbroad nor vague; (4) Act’s liquidated damages provi-
sion withstands First Amendment challenge; and (5) Act does not violate the First
Amendment’s free exercise clause or RFRA).
135 Id. at 656 (“After all, the Act protects public health by promoting unobstructed
access to reproductive health facilities. It also protects public safety by proscribing all
violent, threatening or obstructive conduct specifically aimed at patients and providers of
reproductive health services.”).
136 Reich v. Shiloh True Light Church of Christ, No. 95-2765, 1996 WL 228802, at
*1 (4th Cir. May 7, 1996).
137 See generally, e.g., Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing Na-
tive American inmate’s challenge that prison restrictions placed on his possession of sa-
cred religious items and length of hair violated RFRA); Johnson v. Baker, No. 93-01016,
1995 WL 570913 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1995) (dismissing prisoner’s assertion that the state
violated RFRA by denying him the time he requested for Nation of Islam Muslims to
meet). In some exceptional cases, prisoners prevailed in their RFRA challenges. See gen-
erally, e.g., Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding in favor of a
Muslim prisoner’s challenge against a policy prohibiting prisoners from wearing beards
for religious reasons because it was not the “least restrictive means” to accomplish its
governmental interest); Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding in
favor of prisoner, the founder and practitioner of the Children of the Sun Church, a pan-
Afrikan religion, who claimed that a policy limiting inmates to ten books in their cell
violated RFRA because his religion required reading four different Afro-centric books
daily).
138 See, e.g., Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995)
(dismissing prisoner’s challenge that prison work policies violated his First Amendment
and RFRA rights when they interfered with his ability to attend religious services).
139 See, e.g., McRae v. Johnson, 261 F. App’x 554, 560 (4th Cir. 2008) (dismissing a
challenge from Muslims and Rastafarians who argued that the prison’s hair-length and
facial hair policies burdened their free exercise of religion).
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officials discarded the national identity card of a prisoner who was a mem-
ber of the Moorish Science Temple of America, the Sixth Circuit found that
prison officials did not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of
plaintiff’s religion.140
Early RFRA challenges also failed in several other contexts. In 1995,
the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim by parents that a county’s refusal to pro-
vide a cued speech translator to their child in a private religious school im-
posed a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion.141 In 1999, the
Third Circuit rejected a devout Quaker’s claim that paying taxes to fund the
military violates her religious beliefs.142 The Second Circuit also dismissed a
Quaker plaintiff’s challenge to the IRS’s penalty for withholding taxes pro-
portional to the spending of the Department of Defense,143 and a secularist
challenge to the “In God We Trust” language on dollar bills.144 Likewise, the
140 Miller-Bey v. Schultz, No. 94-1583, 1996 WL 67941, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 15,
1996) (“Although members of the Moorish Science Temple of America are instructed to
keep their nationality cards with them at all times, members who lose their cards are not
prohibited from praying, reading the Koran, or attending religious services. In fact, mem-
bership in the Moorish Science Temple of America is not in any way dependent on the
possession of a nationality card, and members who lose their cards may order replace-
ment cards.”); cf. Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 572 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that no
substantial burden was established when prisoner, a member of the Yahweh Evangelical
Assembly, alleged that prison impeded his right to observe and assemble for worship on
the Sabbath and to observe the holy rest day); Flick v. Leonard, No. 95-1559, 1996 WL
153914, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 1996) (dismissing a prisoner’s allegation that prison offi-
cials placed a substantial burden on the exercise of his religion by requiring him to de-
clare his religious preference when applying for a prison meal program that
accommodates religious dietary restrictions). Even when courts found that an inmate’s
religious faith was substantially burdened by a prison policy, they often upheld the gov-
ernment interest as compelling. See, e.g., Diaz, 114 F.3d at 71 (holding that length of hair
restrictions substantially burdened the religious practice of Native American inmate, but
long hair constitutes a prison security risk such that the state has a compelling interest in
maintaining its policy); Besh v. Campbell, No. 96-5781, 1997 WL 420501, at *1–2 (6th
Cir. July 8, 1997) (holding that refusing to let Native American inmates possess prayer
blankets, sacred herbs, pray more than once a week, and participate in sweat lodges con-
stitute a substantial burden to free exercise of religion but the state has compelling inter-
est in prison security, uniformity of prison procedures, and conservation of scarce prison
resources).
141 See Goodall v. Stafford Cty. Sch., 60 F.3d 168, 170 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The only
burden claimed by the Goodalls is a financial one, and the sole question at issue is
whether the County is constitutionally or statutorily required to provide the cued speech
services at Matthew’s Christian school, relieving the Goodalls of their financial burden
. . . we find that the economic burden borne by the Goodalls does not substantially im-
pinge on their free exercise rights under RFRA.”).
142 See Adams v. Commissioner, 170 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
tax system used the least restrictive means to achieve its purposes).
143 See Browne v. United States, 176 F.3d 25, 26 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Voluntary compli-
ance is the least restrictive means by which the IRS furthers the compelling governmental
interest in uniform, mandatory participation in the federal income tax system.”); see also
Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90, 93 (2d Cir. 2007) (dismissing the RFRA chal-
lenge of a taxpayer who withheld taxes that would fund military operations to which he
religiously opposed based on “compelling governmental interest”).
144 See Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs
did not establish a “substantial burden” because “the carrying of currency, which is
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Third Circuit rejected the claim of Jewish daughters of a Rabbi who refused
to testify against their father in a criminal trial.145 Free exercise claims regu-
larly failed in RFRA’s first two decades mostly because courts refused to
defer to religious plaintiffs regarding what constitutes “substantial burden”
of religious practice.
This changed after Hobby Lobby and Wheaton College. As Amy
Sepinwall has persuasively argued, both cases began “an era of unstinting
deference to religious belief, often based on fantastical conceptions of com-
plicity exercised at the expense of third parties who incur a burden in light of
an accommodation obtained by the religious adherent.”146 Now, in the post-
Hobby Lobby era, religious law has the potential of becoming the supreme
law of the land.147
fungible and not publicly displayed, does not implicate concerns that its bearer will be
forced to proclaim a viewpoint contrary to his own”).
145 The daughters claimed that testifying would violate the biblical commandment to
“honor thy father and mother.” In re The Grand Jury Empaneling of the Special Grand
Jury, 171 F.3d 826, 836–37 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the government had a compelling
interest in investigating and punishing crime, and that the least restrictive means were
used because the daughters were uniquely situated to provide the sought information).
146 See Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity, supra note 15, at 1901; see generally R
Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014) (holding that Wheaton was not
required to file the form excusing it from the contraceptive mandate as long as it notified
the Secretary of HHS in writing of its exemption request).
147 See id. at 1902. In reality, federal courts after Hobby Lobby have split on the issue
of deference. Several courts refused to defer to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Wheaton College, 791
F.3d at 800 (“Wheaton further argues that requiring it to ask for an exemption and to
provide the government with the name of its insurer violates its First Amendment rights
by compelling it to say something that it does not want to say. That would be the
equivalent of entitling a tax protester to refuse on First Amendment grounds to fill out a
1099 form and mail it to the Internal Revenue Service. Wheaton remains free to voice its
opposition to the use of emergency contraceptives.”); E. Tex. Baptist Univ. v. Burwell,
793 F.3d 449, 459 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Although the plaintiffs have identified several acts
that offend their religious beliefs, the acts they are required to perform do not include
providing or facilitating access to contraceptives. Instead, the acts that violate their faith
are those of third parties. Because RFRA confers no right to challenge the independent
conduct of third parties, we join our sister circuits in concluding that the plaintiffs have
not shown a substantial burden on their religious exercise.”); Little Sisters of the Poor
Home for the Aged v. Burwell, 794 F.3d 1151, 1173 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Although Plain-
tiffs allege the administrative tasks required to opt out of the Mandate make them com-
plicit in the overall delivery scheme, opting out instead relieves them from complicity.
Furthermore, these de minimis administrative tasks do not substantially burden religious
exercise for the purposes of RFRA.”); Catholic Health Care Sys. v. Burwell, 796 F.3d
207, 220 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[V]iewed objectively, completing a form stating that one has a
religious objection is not a substantial burden . . . . As other courts have concluded, a
religious objector’s submission of the form or letter does not, as a legal matter, trigger or
facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage.”); Mich. Catholic Conference & Cath-
olic Family Servs. v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738, 741 (6th Cir. 2015) (“We join our sister
circuits in holding (1) that the accommodation provision does not violate RFRA and (2)
that nothing in Hobby Lobby changes this conclusion.”); Univ. of Notre Dame v.
Burwell, 786 F.3d 606, 614 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The delivery of a copy of the form to [the
insurance issuer] reminds it of an obligation that the law, not the university, imposes on
it—the obligation to pick up the ball if Notre Dame decides, as is its right, to drop it.”).
The Eighth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion on the question of defer-
ence. See Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 801 F.3d 927,
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IV. RESISTING FAITH-BASED EMERGENCY POWERS
Faith-Based Emergency Powers constitute a serious threat to the rule of
law because they enable individual decision-makers to violate legally recog-
nized rights whenever they are (or claimed to be) inconsistent with religious
values or moral faith. This Article offers two principal ways to resist this
threat. First, lawmakers, the media, and the public must critically assess the
reality of the claimed crisis or emergency. Specifically, the idea that Christi-
anity is under attack should be subject to close and critical scrutiny. Second,
lawmakers should not defer to religious dissenters regarding what constitutes
a “substantial burden” on religious practice because such deference would,
as Justice Scalia warned, “in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law
unto himself.”148
A. Contesting the Reality of Crisis
Perhaps the most important step in resisting Faith-Based Emergency
Powers involves rejecting the allegation that a crisis or an emergency exists.
As Part II demonstrates, in both the War on Terror and the Culture Wars, the
success of conservative arguments depends on declaring wars and states of
emergency. In the War on Terror, the alleged crisis involves national secur-
ity; in the Culture Wars, Christianity and Christians are allegedly under at-
tack. In the War on Terror, the government typically advances factual
allegations of a national-security emergency to support robust security mea-
sures such as wiretapping, ongoing detention, or immigration bans.149 In the
Culture Wars, individuals, businesses, and public officials typically advance
factual allegations of a religious emergency to support exemptions from es-
tablished laws. The desired effects are similar: an emergency calls for
exceptionalism.
The role of the Judiciary in questioning assessments of the political
branches regarding the existence of an emergency is well-established150 and
941 (8th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f one sincerely believes that completing Form 700 or HHS
Notice will result in conscience-violating consequences, what some might consider an
otherwise neutral act is a burden too heavy to bear.”).
148 Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)).
149 See Legalism and Decisionism, supra note 7, at 704–06. R
150 See, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 546 (1924) (finding that the
emergency that justified interference with the ordinarily existing private rights in 1919
had come to an end in 1922 and were no longer consistent with the Fifth Amendment);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“No
pronouncement of the commanding officer can, in my view, preclude judicial inquiry and
determination whether an emergency ever existed and whether, if so, it remained, at the
date of the restraint out of which the litigation arose.”); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 658 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (affirming District
Court opinion that the Navy’s argument that emergency circumstances prevented normal
compliance with National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 raised a serious question of
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was reaffirmed in Bush-era War on Terror litigation.151 In situations involv-
ing national security, the Government, usually the Executive, typically justi-
fies taking measures that impinge on the rights of citizens or non-citizens by
characterizing a given situation as a crisis or an emergency.152 When human
rights are at stake, this judicial responsibility becomes of paramount
importance.
The litigation that has stemmed from President Donald Trump’s Muslim
Ban is an excellent illustration of popular and judicial resistance to the exis-
tence of an alleged national-security emergency.153 Citing the attacks of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the Executive Order declared that “the United States must
ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward
it and its founding principles”154 and that “[d]eteriorating conditions in cer-
tain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likeli-
hood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United
States.”155 Two States immediately challenged the Ban on constitutional and
statutory grounds, and a federal district court temporarily enjoined its en-
forcement.156 The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s position that an
actual emergency exits, emphasizing that “[t]he Government has pointed to
no evidence that any alien from any of the countries named in the Order has
perpetrated a terrorist attack in the United States.”157 The three-judge panel
on the Ninth Circuit took the first step proposed in this Article: challenging
the factual existence of an emergency.
This same type of critical analysis of emergency claims is called for in
today’s Culture Wars. The reproductive rights of women and sexual minori-
ties are not—and are wrongly portrayed as—an attack on Christians or
Christianity. Case-by-case, lawmakers, jurists, the media, and the public
must challenge framing reproductive and LGBT rights as an emergency or a
war on religion. From Pat Buchanan’s 1992 declaration of “a religious war”
whether that interpretation was lawful, and questioned whether there was a true
emergency).
151 See e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (holding that the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus); Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that due process required that United
States citizen being held as enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest
factual basis for his detention); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006) (holding
that Detainee Treatment Act did not deprive Supreme Court of jurisdiction).
152 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733.
153 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141-JLR, 2017 WL 462040, at *2–3 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 3, 2017).
157 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2017) (“By contrast, the
States have offered ample evidence that if the Executive Order were reinstated even tem-
porarily, it would substantially injure the States and multiple ‘other parties interested in
the proceeding.”).
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over the “soul of America”158 to Justice Scalia’s 1996 endorsement of this
theme of war through the use of the term “Kulturkampf,” 159 conservatives
have successfully depicted the ongoing quest for equal rights for women and
minorities in the United States as a war against Christians. This violent rhet-
oric, as Part II demonstrates, has continued to be endorsed in recent re-
sponses to marriage equality rights and challenges to the contraceptives
mandate.160 Marriage equality in particular has seen state legislatures declar-
ing states of emergency161 and politicians invoking “Nazi Germany,”162 “lib-
eral fascism,”163 and “jihad” in regards to Christians who now face the
reality of same-sex marriage.164
Rejection of the rhetoric of war and emergency takes place across legal,
political and public debates. This is what Justice Sotomayor offered in
Wheaton College165 when she argued that “[e]ven if one accepts Wheaton’s
view that the self-certification procedure violates RFRA,”166 the Court’s
emergency injunction should be “rare” and “extreme.”167 Similarly, while
testifying in Congressional deliberation regarding FADA, Katherine Franke
emphasized that religious freedoms in the United States are not under at-
tack168 and that, instead, what conservatives really seek in this alleged crisis
is an unconstitutional establishment of Christianity as the main religion in
the United States.169 Sotomayor and Franke embody one of this Article’s pro-
posed courses of action: contesting the reality of a crisis or emergency to
Christianity in the Culture Wars.170
158 See Buchanan, supra note 38 (“In that struggle for the soul of America, Clinton & R
Clinton are on the other side, and George Bush is on our side. And so, we have to come
home, and stand beside him.”); see also HARTMAN, supra note 2, at 1. R
159 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 See discussion supra Part II.A.
161 See, e.g., H.R. 1632, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ind. 2015); S. 568,
119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (Ind. 2015). H.R. 1220, Legis. Assemb., 19th
Sess. § 5 (S.D. 2015). S. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg Sess. § 2 (Ark. 2015).
162 See, e.g., David Badash, Head of Christian Group Warns Same-Sex Marriage Just
Like ‘Unthinkable’ Atrocities of Nazi Germany, THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
(May 31, 2016), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/davidbadash/head_of_chris
tian_group_warns_same_sex_marriage_just_like_unthinkable_atrocities_of_nazi_germa
ny [https://perma.cc/XY9N-VDUY].
163 See, e.g., Scott Eric Kaufman, Ted Cruz’s Repugnant Anti-gay Screed: Marriage
Equality is “Liberal Fascism” against Christians, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www
.salon.com/2015/04/27/ted_cruzs_repugnant_anti_gay_screed_marriage_equality_is_lib
eral_fascism_against_christians/ [https://perma.cc/X3TE-9HT9].
164 See, e.g., John Wright, Ted Cruz Warns Of Gay-Rights ‘Jihad,’ Continues Holy
War Against Same-Sex Marriage, TOWLEROAD (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.towleroad
.com/2015/04/ted-cruz-says-gays-are-waging-jihad-on-religious-freedom-but-hes-the-
real-suicide-bomber/ [https://perma.cc/N4WK-7KHD].
165 See Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806, 2808 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
166 Id. at 2808.
167 See id.
168 See Statement of Katherine Franke, supra note 20, at 43. R
169 See id. at 44–45, 59–60.
170 The media is also an important institution that can resist the rhetoric of crisis to
Christianity. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: World War C - Happy Holidays
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The goal of the quest for equal rights, from reproductive autonomy to
marriage equality, was never to wage war on Christianity. Two people of the
same sex wishing to marry and spend their lives together and a woman’s
reproductive autonomy are not acts of war and hostility. Promisingly, many
religious denominations have accepted that these, and many others, are acts
of love, not hate.171 While conservatives have been successful at invoking a
Christian crisis, it is critical that challengers emphasize the purpose and in-
tent of antidiscrimination legislation, which is not religious attacks but
greater human freedom.
B. Refusing Deference to Religious Dissenters
In both the War on Terror and in the Culture Wars, the end game of
emergency powers rationales has been to promote deference to a decision-
maker who represents the conservative position. Specifically, in both wars,
conservatives have promoted decision-makers who would restore the lost
power of an allegedly wounded entity: the President in the War on Terror
and religious dissenters in the Culture Wars.172
In RFRA and RFRA-like challenges to antidiscrimination laws, courts
should insist that “substantial burden” is a legal question for them to decide
and not a factual question for the religious dissenter. Similarly, lawmakers
should resist the conservative claim for deference to religious dissenters on
(Comedy Central television broadcast Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/
sgi6nx/the-daily-show-with-jon-stewart-world-war-c--happy-holidays [https://perma.cc/
M55C-MEZX] (“The sense of persecution is always at its worst right around this time of
the year . . . the war on Christmas . . . who will save Christmas?”). Here, Stewart re-
sponds to conservative figures who regularly allege that Christmas is under attack. See,
e.g., Petula Dvorak, The Phony ‘War on Christmas’ is Back, Fueled by Those Alleged
Jesus Haters at Starbucks, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/the-phony-war-on-christmas-is-back-fueled-by-those-alleged-jesus-haters-at-
starbucks/2015/11/09/ed8471de-86f7-11e5-9a07-453018f9a0ec_story
.html?utm_term=.89915a956f17 [https://perma.cc/3XCD-Y834]; Liam Stack, How the
‘War on Christmas’ Controversy Was Created, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www
.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/us/war-on-christmas-controversy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
T3TM-6E9U]; Dan Cassino, How Fox News Created the War on Christmas, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/how-fox-news-created-the-war-on-christmas
[https://perma.cc/AY35-ZYLN].
171 See, e.g., Conservative Jews Approve Gay Wedding Guidelines, FOX NEWS (June
1, 2012) http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/06/01/conservative-jews-approve-gay-wed-
ding-guidelines.html [https://perma.cc/XD9H-YC44]; Dalai Lama Supports Gay Mar-
riage, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2014) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/
tibet/10682492/Dalai-Lama-supports-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/3YNU-
KXLX] (“If two people–a couple–really feel that way is more practical, more sort of
satisfaction, both sides fully agree, then OK.”); Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and
Queer Justice, UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASS’N, https://www.uua.org/lgbtq [https://per
ma.cc/R9LP-T4K9] (“As Unitarian Universalists, we not only open our doors to people
of all sexual orientations and gender identities, we value diversity of sexuality and gender
and see it as a spiritual gift. We create inclusive religious communities and work for
LGBTQ justice and equity as a core part of who we are.”).
172 Political scientist Corey Robin describes conservatism as a “felt experience of
having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back.” ROBIN, supra note 2, at 4. R
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what constitutes a “substantial burden.” Just as the President cannot simply
claim an immigration law crisis without convincing federal courts that an
emergency indeed exists,173 individual dissenters should not be able to assert
that legally established rights substantially burden their religious exercise
without convincing a court that it truly does.
The main goal of Faith-Based Emergency Powers today is to continue
to carve out exemptions for religious and moral dissenters from legally rec-
ognized marriage and reproductive rights. This involves seeking legislative
and judicial deference to individual religious dissenters who seek to discrim-
inate against women and sexual minorities.174 Lawmakers and the public
must refuse to grant such deference. This is necessary if secular law—not
religious law—is to remain sovereign in the United States.
CONCLUSION
In the twenty-first century, we are allegedly in the midst of at least two
wars: a War on Terror and the Culture Wars. In both, conservatives have
promoted a rhetoric of crisis and emergency to support a position that calls
for limiting or suspending the human rights of those on the “other side.”
This strategy is not new. Since at least the 1930s, conservative jurists in
Europe and in the United States had theorized that crisis-based exceptional-
ism, when successfully invoked, is the marker of true sovereignty.175 In other
words, they have insisted that the ability to suspend human rights, even tem-
porarily, is a sign of true political power. Thus, since September 11, 2011 in
the War on Terror, conservatives have attempted to place that political power
in the hands of the President and the executive branch. In today’s Culture
Wars, they have attempted to place it in the hands of religious and moral
dissenters. In both contexts, the consequences can be grave for those whose
civil rights are stripped away.
The War on Terror and the Culture Wars both involve complicated and
often painful ethical, moral, and legal dilemmas. A lot is at stake. In the War
on Terror, the value of national security may come into direct tension with
the value of human rights such as freedom, privacy, and Due Process. In the
Culture Wars, religious or moral faith, often authentic and deeply felt by
individuals or groups, may come into tension with human rights of sexual
minorities and women such as the right to marry and reproductive freedom.
In both contexts, there are many honest and decent people on both sides of
173 See generally Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017).
174 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 105. R
175 See generally, e.g., SCHMITT, supra note 114 (arguing that in national security R
emergencies, the president and the executive branch should get full deference from the
rest of the political system, and that this is a sign of true sovereignty); Vermeule, supra
note 9 (arguing that legislatures, the public, and especially courts must defer to the Presi- R
dent and the executive branch in matters involving national security).
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the conservative/liberal divide who simply wish to thrive within the state
with freedom and dignity.
This Article does not seek to belittle the concerns of conservatives in
the War on Terror or in the Cultures Wars. Rather, it is a critique of one
conservative strategy that strips decision-making power in some of the hard-
est dilemmas that society encounters today from where that power belongs:
the courts. I have elsewhere called this conservative strategy “Decision-
ism,”176 which essentially refers to the concept that whoever gets to “de-
cide” what human rights mean and when they can be suspended is the real
sovereign in nation-states.177 A true commitment to the rule of law involves
faith that the Constitution and its designated interpreters—the courts—are
the ultimate decision-makers in the American legal system. It is for them to
decide how to reconcile those hard questions of conflicting values in a plu-
ralistic society. To deprive courts from that decision-making responsibility
would “in effect . . . permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”178
176 See Legalism and Decisionism, supra note 7; Legal Holes, supra note 7. R
177 See articles cited supra note 176. R
178 Emp’t Div., Dep’t. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879)).
